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David Levine
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#	Item
141	Title: The Castle on the Hill Author: David K. Levine Department of Economics UCLA Los Angeles, CA[removed]phone/fax[removed] Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2000-01-04 12:26:06 Nash equilibrium Repeated game Extensive-form game Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Minimax Subgame Strategy Game theory Problem solving Mathematics
142	Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game* By Phillip Johnson, ([removed]) Centro de Investigacion Economía, Instituto Technologico Autonomo de Mexico, David K. Levine, ([removed]) Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2001-07-07 10:56:12 Mathematical structures Altruism Tit for tat Determinacy Strategy Vector space Strategic dominance Flag Structure Algebra Game theory Mathematics
143	Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed] Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41 Outcome Strategy Normal-form game Repeated game Risk dominance Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
144	Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population1 David K. Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer2 First version: September 29, 1999 This version: May 10, 2000 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2000-05-10 11:49:25 Nash equilibrium Science Strategy Risk dominance Best response Continuous game Evolutionary game theory Game theory Problem solving Economics
145	Learning and Equilibrium Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine First version: June 9, 2008 This version: August 30, 2008 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2008-08-31 09:53:22** Fictitious play Best response Nash equilibrium Solution concept Extensive-form game Peyton Young Strategy Evolutionary game theory Outcome Game theory Problem solving Economics
146	Neuroeconomics?1 March 3, 2011 David K. Levine2 1 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2011-03-03 08:55:37 Gaming Quantal response equilibrium Nash equilibrium Strategy Bargaining Solution concept Experimental economics Self-confirming equilibrium Outcome Game theory Problem solving Decision theory
147	An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine and Zacharias Maniadis1 Abstract Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2012-08-03 06:23:17 Statistics Macroeconomics Microeconomics Knowledge Utility Decision theory Expected utility hypothesis
148	Repeated Games with Frequent Signals Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: February 6, 2007 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2008-06-02 12:42:51 Continuous function Strategy Outcome Mathematics Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
149	CAN A TURING PLAYER IDENTIFY ITSELF? DAVID K. LEVINE AND AND BALÁZS SZENTES A BSTRACT. We show that the problem of whether two Turing Machines are functionally equivalent is undecidable and explain why this is significa Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2006-03-16 11:03:47 Applied mathematics Alan Turing Turing machine Theory of computation Models of computation Computability NP Machine that always halts Halting problem Theoretical computer science Computability theory Mathematics
150	Learning and the Stock Flow Model1 David K. Levine Department of Economics UCLA April 16, 1996 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 1997-12-29 20:46:44 Nash equilibrium Partial differential equation Best response Economics Game theory Mathematics Mathematical analysis

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